Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. ___ (2007),
was a First Amendment
student free speech case in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a school principal may, consistent with the First
Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event when that speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.
In 2002, 18-year-old Joseph Frederick was suspended from
the high school where he was a senior after he displayed a banner reading
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" across the street from the school in Juneau,
Alaska, during
the Winter Olympics torch
relay.
On January 24, 2002, students and staff were permitted to
leave classes at Juneau-Douglas High School to attend a
school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, to watch the Olympic
torch pass by. Frederick, who was late for school that day, joined some
friends on the sidewalk across from the high school, off of school grounds.
Frederick and his friends waited for the television cameras so they could
unfurl a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS".
Morse initially suspended Joseph Frederick for five days
for violating the school district's anti-drug policy, but increased the
suspension to ten days after
On April 25, 2002, Frederick filed a civil rights lawsuit against Morse and the
school board in the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska claiming they violated his
federal and state constitutional rights to free speech.
The United States
District Court for the District of Alaska ruled in favor of the School
Board and Deborah Morse. On appeal, the 9th US Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the federal district court's decision. Regarding
the circuit court's decision,
The Ninth Circuit
reversed the decision of the District Court. Despite deciding that the incident
took place during a school event, the court held that
The school board petitioned the Supreme Court to review
the Ninth Circuit's decision. On December 1,
2006, the Court
accepted the case.
Kenneth Starr first spoke on behalf of the
petitioning school principal. He described the rule in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District as 'that there is a
right to political speech subject to disruption — that the speech not be
disruptive'. He defined the disruptiveness in general terms as behavior
inimical to the educational mission of the school, and in specific terms as
violation of the school's announced policy to enforce and support laws with
respect to control of marijuana (and other laws in general). He also cited the
cases of Bethel School District v. Fraser
and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier.
Starr noted that in Tinker there was no written
policy; it was an issue of "standardless discretion" being exercised.
That case was said to be concerned with school disciplinary actions
"casting a pall of orthodoxy to prevent the discussion of ideas."
Justice Souter remarked that 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus'
"sounds like just a kid's provocative statement to me."
Starr defined as one of his themes that "the key is
to allow the school official to interpret the message as long as that
interpretation is reasonable."
Deputy Solicitor-General Edwin Kneedler spoke on behalf
of the
In oral argument, Douglas Mertz for the respondent
opened, "This is a case about free speech. It is not about drugs." Chief Justice John
Roberts responded: "It's a case about money. Your client wants money
from the principal personally for her actions in this case." Mertz spoke
for the respondent student's claim to have been unlawfully punished. He stated
the two aspects of his defense as 'pure free speech', and 'the public place
argument.' He argued that the respondent was 'not in school' prior to being
confronted by the petitioner because of his truancy on the
morning of the day in question.
Starr rebutted. He cited Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton and Earls as cases demonstrative of the
Court's strong past stances on matter related to combating the 'scourge of
drugs.' In closing and in summary he said:
"To promote drugs is utterly
inconsistent with the educational mission of the school. The court has spoken
more broadly with respect to the need to defer to school officials in
identifying the educational mission. We know that there are constitutional limits
(to lawful political expression). Those limits are captured in Tinker. A
passive pure political speech that reflects on the part of the school board a
standardless discretionary effort to squelch any kind of controversial discussion, that casts a pall of orthodoxy over the class
room: we are light years away from that."
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
concluded that the school officials did not violate the First Amendment by
confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending the student responsible for it.
The opinion first concluded that
The opinion then moved on to discussing the case at hand,
and emphasized the government's "important--indeed, perhaps compelling interest"
in deterring drug use by students. To this point, the opinion cited statistics
illustrating the problems of youth drug abuse. It further noted that part of a
school's educational mission "to educate students about the dangers of
illegal drugs and to discourage their use." Based on these concerns, the
opinion concluded that the principal's actions were motivated by a
"serious and palpable" danger of drug abuse quite different from the
amorphous fears of anti-war sentiment at play in Tinker v. Des Moines, .
In Tinker, the school principal had punished
students for wearing black anti-war armbands based on his
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" or "mere
desire to avoid ... discomfort and unpleasantness." Here, however, the
concern about student drug abuse "extends well beyond an abstract desire
to avoid controversy." Principal Morse's failure to act against the banner
"would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, including
Justice Clarence
Thomas wrote a concurrence that argued that students in public schools do
not have a right to free speech and that Tinker should be overturned. He
praised Hugo
Black's dissenting opinion on Tinker and called it
"prophetic".
Justice Samuel
Alito, joined by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, wrote a concurrence indicating that he agreed with the majority
opinion to the extent that:
(a) it goes no further than to hold that a
public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as
advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction
of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or
social issue, including speech on issues such as "the wisdom of the war on
drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use."
Justice Stephen
Breyer concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing
that the Court should not have directly answered the First Amendment question
in the case, but rather decided it based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that requires courts to
enter judgment in favor of a government employee accused of violating
individual rights unless the employee's conduct violates "clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Because it was not clear whether the school principal's
actions in taking down the banner violated the First Amendment, Breyer would
have simply issued a narrow decision indicating that she was shielded by
qualified immunity and gone no further.
Justice John
Paul Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg,
argued that "the Court does serious violence to the First Amendment in
upholding—indeed, lauding—a school's decision to punish
the school's interest in protecting its
students from exposure to speech "reasonably regarded as promoting illegal
drug use," ante, at 1, cannot justify disciplining Frederick for his
attempt to make an ambiguous statement to a television audience simply because
it contained an oblique reference to drugs. The First Amendment demands more,
indeed, much more.
Stevens excoriated the majority decision as one that
"trivializes the two cardinal principles upon which Tinker
rests," because it "upholds a punishment meted out on the basis of a
listener's disagreement with her understanding (or, more likely,
misunderstanding) of the speaker's viewpoint." Moreover, he noted,
"Encouraging drug use might well increase the likelihood that a listener
will try an illegal drug, but that hardly justifies censorship."
"[C]arving out pro-drug speech for uniquely harsh treatment," wrote
Stevens, "finds no support in our case law and is inimical to the values
protected by the First Amendment."
Stevens also took issue with the majority's
interpretation of the banner as being a serious incitement to drug use:
Admittedly, some high school students
(including those who use drugs) are dumb. Most students, however, do not shed
their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy when
they see it. The notion that the message on this banner would actually persuade
either the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her
behavior is most implausible.
Stevens argued that it would be "profoundly unwise
to create special rules for speech about drug and alcohol use," pointing
to the historical examples of both opposition to the Vietnam War
and resistance to Prohibition in the 1920s. Pointing to the current debate
over medical marijuana, Stevens concluded,
"Surely our national experience with alcohol should make us wary of
dampening speech suggesting—however inarticulately—that it would be better to
tax and regulate marijuana than to persevere in a futile effort to ban its use
entirely."